People assess their own abilities in various situations of everyday life. Although we may not be consciously aware of it, we frequently consider our physical and mental constitution when we encounter both novel and routine tasks (cf. Ackerman & Wolman, 2007) . For instance, we might contemplate whether our abilities and skills match our career aspirations, whether we can run fast enough to still catch that bus, or whether we are capable of writing an eloquent introduction to a research article. In fact, we evaluate not only our own abilities but also the abilities of other people (Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Fussell & Krauss, 1991) . With respect to cognitive ability, we see differences in how smart our friends are, and we ponder how smart we are compared to them (Goethals & Klein, 2000) . In order to arrive at such conclusions, we need to rely on information available from a variety of sources. As for the assessment of our own abilities, these sources comprise prior practical experience made with similar tasks, self-efficacy beliefs, level of aspiration, and even feedback in the form of results from standardized, objective, and usually scientifically devised psychometric ability tests (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007; Arsenian, 1942; Meyer, 1982) . However, social comparison processes are the most important source. Such processes help us understand how our own abilities compare with those of other people by providing information, observed from a multitude of everyday situations, in relative terms (Guimond, 2006; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Mussweiler, 2003a Mussweiler, , 2003b .
In general, the evaluation of such sources leads to self-estimates of abilities, such as cognitive ability, physical ability, social ability, and so forth, which are a vital part of a person's self-concept (Epstein, 1973) . It can be argued that self-estimates of our own abilities should be relatively unbiased and closely related to our actual ability levels because we are constantly provided with real-life information about how we perform from all kinds of the abovementioned sources. However, many studies have found evidence that self-assessments are biased, mostly in the direction of a positively distorted self-evaluation (see, for instance, Brim, Glass, Neulinger, & Firestone, 1969; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Maxwell & Lopus, 1994) . According to this body of research, one well-documented distortion in selfassessment is the better-than-average effect, which is simply defined as a person's tendency to believe that her or his ability is above average (Guenther & Alicke, 2010) . Such distortions are useful in helping individuals establish and maintain a positive self-concept because they facilitate self-esteem and feelings of self-worth and seem to be a necessary part of mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988) . Furthermore, less positively biased perceptions of the self and of the world are associated with depressive distortions and mental illness, although it is still up to discussion whether depression is associated with a realistic perception (de-pressive realism; Alloy & Abramson, 1979 or an overly negative distortion (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Dobson & Franche, 1989; Stone, Dodrill, & Johnson, 2001) .
In this meta-analysis, the focus is on cognitive ability. Cognitive ability seems to be particularly important to people because it is intuitive to most that being smart has advantages, and we can see proof of that in many situations of everyday life. For example, people know that access to higher academic education is closely tied to performance at school and on standardized tests measuring scholastic ability (e.g., Freudenthaler, Spinath, & Neubauer, 2008) . They also know that academic education facilitates the pursuit of financially lucrative careers, so that in essence, being smart pays off. Research provides further evidence that cognitive ability predicts a wide variety of life outcomes (e.g., Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004) . Among these outcomes are not only academic performance and occupational attainment but also many aspects of social life and, albeit indirectly, even mortality (Gottfredson, 1997b; Lubinski, 2000; O'Toole & Stankov, 1992; .
It is not just the actual cognitive ability level-which in many cases may in fact be unknown-that plays a role when individuals choose an education, career, and job. Self-estimations of cognitive ability are relevant as well because they reflect how people think about themselves in a subjective way, and they are also readily available to every individual. The misjudgment of abilities can generally have a considerable impact. For instance, overestimating one's car driving ability may lead to an accident. In this vein, the incorrect assessment of one's own cognitive ability almost invariably affects crucial life outcomes by decreasing the likelihood of achieving valuable goals (Ackerman & Wolman, 2007) . Consider an individual's career choice: Overestimation of cognitive ability may lead to experience and feelings of failure and frustration, as the anticipated career may prove to be out of reach or too difficult to achieve success. On the flip side, underestimation of cognitive ability can result in boredom and, consequently, underperformance. For society as a whole, a close fit between ability and job demands is desirable because it helps decrease a waste of cognitive resources and expenditures on interventions (including occupational retraining and, in extreme cases, even psychotherapy) administered to individuals in the wrong occupational environments.
For cognitive ability, most empirical studies on the relationship between self-estimates and psychometric ability test scores report only weak to moderate correlations. These correlations typically range from about .19 to .39 (for a narrative review see Furnham, 2001 ). This suggests that while the relationship is significant, it appears to be relatively weak (based on the guidelines on the magnitude of effect sizes set by Cohen, 1988) , implying that people are not very successful in estimating their own ability level.
One practical domain where self-assessments of cognitive abilities are routinely applied-despite or even because of such rather low correlations-is the field of vocational counseling, particularly in computer-assisted career guidance systems (e.g., Gati, Noa, & Krausz, 2001 ). Companies such as ACT, SHL, or Valpar International, 1 which are providers of career counseling advice that in part operate on a global scale, integrate explicit self-estimates of abilities into a complex electronic counseling process. The utility of self-estimates in career counseling is twofold. First, they can be related to the demand characteristics of occupational settings, so that counselees can compare their own self-assessed ability profile to occupational ability profiles. This helps them find occupations with a good fit to their own profile. Such an assessment therefore serves to identify similarities and dissimilarities between counselees' self-estimated ability profiles and the distinct ability profiles of occupations. It is especially suited to being implemented in electronic career guidance systems accessible via the Internet because it does not necessarily require the administration of a standardized, psychometric ability test as well. Instead, the focus is on the self-estimate as an expression of the counselee's selfconcept with respect to her or his ability. Second, the degree to which self-estimated ability reflects actual ability as measured with a standardized ability test can be of interest to counselors. Constructivist career theories and qualitative career assessment methods (cf. McMahon & Patton, 2002; Young & Collin, 2004) call for and enable the counselor to not just apply diagnostic tests and give feedback on the results. Instead, and contrary to such a "test-and-tell" approach, the cognitions of the counselee are integrated into the assessment process in order to evaluate a counselee's self-concept and sense of identity. For instance, Hirschi and Läge (2008) showed how the use of self-estimates yields information beyond objective test scores in the domain of career interest assessment. Analogously, the subjective assessment of a counselee's cognitive ability can be compared to the results of a standardized ability test, and the degree of agreement between the two scores can be informative for the counselor and used in the counseling process because they indicate a counselee's degree of self-concept clarity and realism about personal aptitudes-both are desirable qualities for successful career decision making.
For both application purposes, the relationship between selfestimated and psychometrically assessed ability is critical to their success, albeit with a meaningful distinction. For the purpose of relating self-estimates to job demands, a small relationship simply induces substantial error into the analysis because there is no reliable information on the relationship between an individual's actual ability level and the demand characteristics of a specific occupation. Using self-estimates as proxies for "hard" ability would then be vague and imprecise. For the purpose of comparing self-estimated and psychometrically assessed ability level, it is this error (i.e., the difference between the two measures) that is of interest from the counselor's point of view. Therefore, even though the effectiveness of such career guidance systems is well documented (e.g., Gati et al., 2001; Sampson, 1994; Sampson & Watts, 1992) , a crucial question is how well people can actually be expected to estimate their own level of ability. This concerns the aspect of the validity of self-estimated ability, where the relevant criterion is the score obtained from a psychometric ability test administered under objective, standardized conditions.
The goal of the present article is to investigate the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability, as assessed through their relationship with psychometric ability test scores, by conducting a meta-analysis on the accumulated evidence in the field. Our article is structured as follows: First, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework in which self-estimates of cognitive ability and their relation to respective psychometric assessments using standardized tests can be integrated. This includes the definition of the essential concepts and related constructs, the introduction of extant theories, and the formulation of a general hypothesis. We also identify potential moderator variables that are expected to influence the validity of self-estimates and present corresponding hypotheses. Second, we detail the methods used in our meta-analysis, including our literature search strategy and study selection criteria, the coding process, and the applied analytic strategy. Third, we present the results for the overall relationship and for the moderator analysis. Fourth, the findings are critically discussed, implications for theory and practice are highlighted, limitations are considered, and venues for future research are identified.
Theoretical and Empirical Framework Explicit and Implicit Theories of Cognitive Abilities
Human cognitive ability, often used synonymously with the term intelligence, 2 is one of the best researched, yet historically most controversially discussed, constructs in psychological research (Eysenck, 1998; Sternberg, 1985) . In broad terms, cognitive ability is considered to be a very general category involving a wide variety of abilities, for instance, reasoning, problem solving, or abstract thinking (Gottfredson, 1997a) . Historically, more specific attempts of theorists to converge on a uniform definition of cognitive ability have not been overly successful (Carroll, 1997; "Intelligence and Its Measurement: A Symposium," 1921; Sternberg & Detterman, 1986) . Consequently, extant theories particularly differ in the number of factors considered to be indispensable for comprehending the nature of cognitive ability (Sternberg, 1985) . In fact, the number of factors proposed in the major theories ranges from one (the so-called general factor of intelligence, often simply abbreviated as g; Spearman, 1927) to 150 or even 180 (Guilford, 1982 (Guilford, , 1988 .
However, psychological research in general rarely begins with fully agreed-upon definitions and consistent theories, though it may actually lead to them (Neisser et al., 1996) . Thus, Carroll's (1993) stratum theory of cognitive abilities and its expansion to the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory (CHC; Lohman, 2001; McGrew, 2005) can be viewed as a unifying framework, since it is "an expansion and extension of most of the previous theories of cognitive abilities" (Carroll, 2005, p. 74) . Using factor analysis, Carroll (1993) reanalyzed more than 450 data sets and provided evidence that the abilities of interests could be clustered into three strata: Stratum III consists of one general factor, comparable to Spearman's (1927) g. At Stratum II, this general factor is split into several broad abilities, such as gf (fluid intelligence) and gc (crystallized intelligence), as hypothesized by Cattell (1971) . Finally, at Stratum I, a large number of more narrowly defined abilities are located, for example, memory span or word fluency.
Despite all disputes on the nature of cognitive ability/ intelligence in the research community, every individual has an idea of what constitutes an "intelligent" person. More precisely, besides experts-defined as people dealing intensively with the topic in either research or applied contexts-laypeople have a conception of what cognitive ability is, too, leading to so-called implicit theories of intelligence. These implicit theories have been objects of research for more than 60 years (e.g., Flugel, 1947; Furnham, 2001; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981) . Unlike explicit theories of intelligence, which are formulated and constructed by scientists, implicit theories do not need to be formally invented because they already exist (Sternberg, 1985) . Another distinction is that implicit theories are also rarely systematically and empirically tested by their proponents (e.g., Ruzgis & Grigorenko, 1994) .
With regard to the self-estimation of cognitive ability, such lay conceptualizations may directly affect expectations and evaluations of people's performance on cognitive ability tests (Sternberg, 2000) . Thus, research on laypeople's perceptions of intelligence is of not only academic but also practical relevance (Furnham, 2001) . There is substantial overlap between explicit and implicit theories. According to Sternberg (1985) , this is hardly surprising because explicit theories are actually formalizations of experts' implicit theories. Thus, "traditional" facets of intelligence, such as verbal, numerical, or spatial ability, which can be located at the lower levels of the three-stratum CHC model, are frequently part of both explicit and implicit theories. However, some factors of intelligence mentioned in explicit theories are not shared by laypersons' perceptions and/or their relative importance is viewed differently (e.g., Sternberg et al., 1981) . Here, cultural background is a factor to consider. For instance, in one study different ethnic groups have been found to feature different conceptualizations of "intelligence"-even though they all lived in North Carolina and were subjected to the same cultural mainstream (Heath, 1983) . As another example, in Chinese culture, nonverbal reasoning has been found to be rated as more relevant to intelligence than verbal reasoning (Chen & Chen, 1988) . Ultimately, intercultural differences in implicit theories can make it difficult to carry out meaningful comparisons of ability test scores across cultures (Greenfield, 1997) . This is true from a conceptual as well as a methodological perspective (cf. Byrne et al., 2009) . Concerning the latter, many studies neglect to pay sufficient attention to issues of measurement invariance across the groups under study. The comparison of test scores obtained from measures across groups requires that these scores possess the same psychometric properties in each group. The absence of measurement invariance is designated as measurement bias and-theoretically-prohibits using such test scores to make between-groups comparisons (cf. Meredith, 1993; Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993; van de Vijver & Leung, 1997 . Measurement invariance is usually investigated using methods of multigroup confirmatory factor analysis or item response theory (including methods for the analysis of differential item functioning, e.g., Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . It can be applied not only to scores on performance tests but also to all kinds of psychometric measures in general.
One construct that has repeatedly been discussed in the context of cultural influence on test performance is stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) . In general, stereotype threat implies that the performance on cognitive tasks of certain minority group members is affected by their anxiety that their performance may confirm a negative stereotype about their group. Wicherts, Dolan, and Hessen (2005) showed that issues of stereotype threat can be interpreted as a lack of measurement invariance and accordingly modeled in the same methodological framework.
Just like the definition of cognitive ability, the definition of self-estimation is rather imprecise and varies between studies. In order to come up with a working solution, we globally define self-estimation as a person's perception of her or his own abilities. Self-estimation is a process that is based on and involves repeated assessments in a variety of different concrete situations. Accordingly, this leads to domain-specific ability self-estimates. Selfestimation is different from the construct of self-concept, which is per se more general in scope (Marsh, 1990) . More precisely, self-estimation is assumed to be an expression of self-concept, which by nature is "organized, multifaceted, hierarchical, stable, developmental, evaluative, and differentiable" (Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976, p. 411) . Following Epstein (1973) , individuals use their self-concept as a self-theory, and self-estimations can be seen as (a) expressions of hypotheses to test this theory and (b) a means to assimilate new knowledge. As past experience with challenges posed by specific tasks in specific situations influences the formation of self-estimates of ability, such self-estimates can then be used individually as a basis for decision making and performance evaluation.
Although we constantly make self-estimates of our abilities, scientific research offers a rather unflattering picture regarding their degree of accuracy (cf. Ackerman, Beier, & Bowen, 2002) . In order to explain why people make erroneous self-assessments, research has particularly focused on lack of metacognitive insight (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003) . Empirically, Kruger and Dunning (1999) have provided evidence that people with low abilities and skills are especially affected by the tendency toward inflated self-views. In their study, the bottom quartile of performers in various ability domains (humor, logical reasoning, and English grammar) were most likely to overestimate their actual performance. Top performers, on the other hand, actually slightly underestimated their abilities. The extent to which this effect is attributable to statistical artifacts like regression to the mean (Nesselroade, Stigler, & Baltes, 1980) is still up to discussion (Ackerman et al., 2002; Krueger & Mueller, 2002) . However, even after controlling for test score unreliability, the apparent asymmetry does not completely disappear (Kruger & Dunning, 2002) .
Previous research has identified several variables and situational factors that influence the formation of distorted self-views (Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Kruger, 1999) . Probably the most influential of these is the specificity of the trait being evaluated: Given an ambiguous trait (such as the rather broad domain of general cognitive ability), an imprecise estimation of actual ability appears to be more likely (Ackerman et al., 2002) . Dunning et al. (1989) suggested that content ambiguity contributes to idiosyncratic definitions of traits that allow for the maintenance of a positive self-view, which in general implies an overestimation of ability. A common theme expressed in the extant literature, therefore, is "that the ability to accurately judge one's own ability is sadly lacking" (Ackerman et al., 2002, p. 588) .
Self-Estimated Versus Psychometrically Measured Cognitive Abilities
The framework in which the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically measured cognitive abilities is embedded comprises theories taken from different areas of research in personality and social psychology. These theories share the assumption that people are motivated to evaluate their own abilities, but for quite different reasons. In this context, particular attention is given to the theory of self-consistency (Lecky, 1945) , the theory of self-enhancement (Jussim, Yen, & Aiello, 1995; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987) , and Festinger's theory of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990) . Self-consistency theory implies that people are motivated to form self-estimations that are consistent with their past experience in order to maintain a certain configuration of self-concept. Thus, prior experiences, but also constructs such as self-esteem, appear crucial for the prediction of the accuracy of self-estimated abilities. In contrast, self-enhancement theory proposes that people tend to view themselves as favorably as possible. For example, Paulhus, Lysy, and Yik (1998) showed that people rarely estimate their own skills to be below average (the better-than-average effect). Festinger's theory of social comparison processes emphasizes situational conditions, which can influence the accuracy of selfestimated intelligence scores. The primary assumption of this theory is that abilities can be compared to two main sources of information, namely, physical and social standards. Since physical standards are inaccessible when trying to self-estimate cognitive ability, ability estimates are primarily the result of comparisons with other people. Empirically, the relationship between self-estimated cognitive abilities and psychometric test scores has been reported to be only weak to moderate. But despite such apparently rather discouraging findings, Holling and Preckel (2005) have argued that people are actually "more successful in estimating their general ability than the correlation between self-estimated and tested intelligence suggests" (p. 503). In an empirical study, Holling and Preckel reported a correlation of .46 (based on a sample of 88 participants) between self-estimates of intelligence and scores on an omnibus intelligence test (Intelligenzstrukturtest; IST 70; the IST 70 is a test constructed on the grounds of Thurstone's, 1938 , theory of seven primary mental abilities; the IST 70 and its successor, the IST 2000-R, are among the most commonly applied omnibus intelligence tests in Germany). The standard deviation of the observed test scores was 9.58 (inferred from Holling & Preckel, 2005 3 This suggests that approximately two thirds of the participants showed either a positive or a negative deviation of no more than 8.51 points from their tested scores. Using a correlation of .46 and a standard deviation of 15, which is the standard deviation on the IQ scale, leads to an SEE of 13.32 IQ points. These results are far from perfect, but they illustrate that medium-sized correlations can 3 The formula for the SEE shows that mainly two factors influence its magnitude. These factors are the variance of the criterion scores (s y 2 ) and the correlation between the dependent and independent variable(s): An interesting question is how accurate the prediction would be if the correlation between the two scores was higher, for instance, at r ϭ .80. This would correspond to a large effect size according to the guidelines set by Cohen (1988) . Assuming a correlation of .80 and a standard deviation of 15 leads to an SEE of 9.03 IQ points. This shows that even a large correlation does not lead to a much smaller SEE when the goal is prediction because the standard deviation in the criterion has such a large influence on the SEE. In fact, with a standard deviation as large as 15, one would need a correlation of .95 to obtain an SEE smaller than 5.00 (the SEE for a correlation of .95 is about 4.68). Extant empirical research has shown that the observation of such a close relationship between two psychological constructs is not very likely. In addition, it completely neglects the problem of measurement imprecision. 4 Almost 30 years ago, Mabe and West (1982) conducted a meta-analysis to systematically investigate the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed ability measures. They reported an average correlation coefficient of .29. However, their meta-analysis did not focus just on cognitive ability. Instead, they included very different kinds of abilities (12 different abilities in total, among them also athletic, clerical, interpersonal, and managerial abilities and skills). With respect to the relationship between self-estimated intelligence scores and test scores, Mabe and West could rely only on 12 effect sizes. For this specific relationship, the average effect size was estimated at r ϭ .34. Mabe and West (1982) also analyzed the influence of a number of situational and experimental factors between studies on the effect sizes. According to them, particularly valid self-estimates can be expected if (a) a close fit between the self-assessed ability and the criterion measure is established; (b) the variable of interest is related to performance; (c) past test performance rather than future achievement is assessed; the estimate is made (d) as a social comparison (i.e., in relative terms) or (e) with reference to an explicit comparison group; (f) the corresponding ability distribution is characterized and described; (g) there is explicit assurance of anonymity; (h) the subjects have some experience in the selfevaluation of abilities; and (i) the subjects are expecting a comparison of their self-estimates to objective measures. Mabe and West labeled the presence of these factors favorable measurement conditions. The corresponding results in their meta-analysis, however, are for the complete set of 12 different abilities. Regarding the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability, Mabe and West were unable to conduct a moderator analysis and analyze the impact of the identified favorable measurement conditions due to the small number of effect sizes.
Many studies investigating the relationship between the two variables of interest report more than just one effect size. This leads to nonindependence of effect sizes because effect sizes from a single study share distinct characteristics (such as the same experimental setting, the same [sub]samples, etc.). Although in former meta-analyses researchers often chose to compute an average relationship for such studies, advancements in statistical methods (especially the advent of hierarchical linear modeling) now allow for the incorporation of multiple effect sizes per study by taking the cluster structure of effect sizes nested in studies into account. We detail this methodological approach in the Method section.
In the meta-analysis by Mabe and West (1982) , the empirical basis for the correlation between self-assessed and psychometrically measured intelligence was very small, but it seems that this area of research has become a focal point of interest in the last 20 years, as indicated by the number of publications in the field: More than two thirds of the studies included in the present meta-analysis were published after 1990. In the same period, the availability of do-it-yourself tests has virtually exploded. There are various magazine and book publications on intelligence and intelligence tests; television shows featuring IQ tests are popular; and over the Internet, people can freely access all kinds of tests and questionnaires. Even though the scientific quality of many such tests may often be questionable, test takers have an opportunity to gain experience with different kinds of tasks, get feedback, and thus develop a better understanding of their own proficiency. An exemplary search using the keywords "free IQ test" in Google yielded over 3 million hits (search conducted on March 20, 2011). It could thus be argued that modern media, especially the Internet, have enormous potential to give laypeople a better understanding of a construct as elusive as cognitive ability, which may in turn lead to more valid self-estimates.
Hypotheses

Overall Relationship
Most studies investigating the relationship between selfestimates of cognitive ability and psychometric test scores report significant, positive correlations. In 1982, Mabe and West reported an average effect size of r ϭ .34 (out of 12 effect sizes). We therefore expect to find a significant, positive overall relationship between the two variables.
Influence of Moderator Variables
We do not expect the average, true effect size to be the same for all cases in our analysis but instead assume significant variation. This is equal to assuming a random distribution of the true effect sizes. We further aim at explaining part of this variation through moderator variables. A total of six such moderators are included in this meta-analysis.
Methodology of self-assessment.
Self-estimated cognitive ability scores can be assessed using different kinds of methodologies, the crucial point being whether the estimate is made with reference to a social comparison group or not. According to Festinger's theory of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990) , it is plausible to assume that self-rating cognitive ability based on interindividual (social) comparisons leads to more valid estimates than estimates based on intraindividual comparisons. This is because intraindividual comparisons may prompt a person only to rank order their own abilities, without explicitly necessitating a comparison with others. Scales primarily evoking intraindividual comparisons feature labels with only absolute terms (such as low ability or high ability, or simply bad or good), but they do not mention a frame of social reference. Internal standards thus largely determine how a person will respond on such a scale. A person with high ability levels across all domains may still differentiate between these domains; for instance, she may evaluate her numerical skills to be better than her verbal skills, and therefore think that the latter are rather low compared to the former, while in fact, they may also be above average in comparison with the verbal skills of most other people. Also, a person with a "flat-plateaued" level of abilities may feel forced to differentiate between abilities that are equally high (or low), but without the comparison to other persons, the resulting self-estimated levels of ability are meaningless. A somewhat difficult aspect about the use of scales featuring absolute labels is that some people may still make interpersonal comparisons as well, which inserts another source of error.
Methods explicitly eliciting social comparisons are instead characterized by either the introduction and explanation of a normal distribution curve or by the use of a relative scale (i.e., the anchors of the scale are labeled in relative terms, such as ranging from below average to average to above average, including mention of a social comparison). Exact knowledge of and familiarity with the comparison group can provide a basis for even more valid selfevaluations (Martin, 2000; Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987) . For instance, senior high school students will have developed a good understanding of how capable they are in relation to their peers at their own school but may have difficulty assessing their ability when the reference group is "everybody in your age group" because a simple extrapolation is not possible. Reference to a specific comparison group should therefore add to the positive effect of relative scales. Recently, Goffin and Olson (2011) have discussed social-cognitive and evolutionary processes as reasons why ratings in relative terms can attain superior validity over absolute ratings and provided empirical illustrations using examples from three diverse research contexts (judgments in job performance measurement, the measurement of attitudes, and person perception).
A special case is the use of mixed scales, which are applied in various studies (see, e.g., Rammstedt & Rammsayer, 2002a , 2002b . While mixed scales feature anchors with labels in absolute terms, the middle category is labeled in relative terms (such as average). It is expected that mixed scales do not activate social comparison processes to the same degree as relative scales because they do not unequivocally address interindividual comparisons and may in fact even lead to confusion. Thus, with regard to the methodology of self-assessment, self-estimations made on relative terms are expected to be more valid than self-estimations made on absolute terms. The validity is expected to be even higher when a specific comparison group is mentioned. Mixed scale selfestimates should show no significant increase in validity over exclusively absolute self-estimates.
Ability type. The assessed ability varies substantively across studies, especially with respect to the degree of specificity. This also affects the choice of tasks used for the assessment. Omnibus tests of cognitive ability (viz., general intelligence) make use of a broad selection of tasks, so that strengths and weaknesses of individual test takers with regard to specific tasks are assumed to level out. The respective global scores therefore represent the top stratum of the CHC model. Many tests, however, use only a specific kind of task and accordingly assess a more narrowly defined ability, which can be located at a lower stratum in the CHC model. It seems reasonable to assume that the kind of measured ability affects the validity of self-estimates for two reasons. First, prior research has shown that a lack of familiarity with a task often leads to more erroneous self-estimates (Ng & Earl, 2008) . Therefore, the more familiar people are with a task, the more valid the self-estimates should be. Since people in educational settings are usually confronted with tasks requiring verbal, numerical, and spatial abilities, they are familiar with and experienced in evaluating these, so that the degree of ambiguity should be rather small. Furthermore, these "traditional" abilities are emphasized in many common IQ tests and in popular books dealing with intelligence and its measurement (Furnham, 2000) .
Second, tasks vary with regard to how salient they are for a test taker. Task salience is particularly tied to a layperson's conception of intelligence. Furnham (2001) suggested that most people consider numerical, spatial, and verbal abilities to be the "essence of intelligence" (p. 1401). Although other studies concerning laypeople's theories of intelligence focus on different abilities (e.g., Brim et al., 1969; Sternberg et al., 1981) , the importance of verbal ability for implicit theories has been confirmed in most of them.
Third, it should be easier for individuals to compare their level of ability to that of others in the numerical, spatial, or verbal domains because opportunities for such comparisons are offered in many situations of everyday life. The abilities required in such concrete situations do not have to be integrated into a theoretically complete ability compound, as represented by general cognitive ability, and individuals are therefore assumed to be more successful at assessing them than general cognitive ability.
To sum up, we hypothesize that self-estimates concerning verbal, numerical, or spatial abilities should be more valid than self-assessments of general cognitive ability, which in turn is usually a compound of different subabilities (as implemented in omnibus test batteries). Consequently, use of these "standard" abilities should also result in more valid self-estimates than use of more rarely assessed abilities, such as memory or processing speed, for instance.
Order of assessment. Self-estimates require the availability of prior experience, which is usually evaluated in light of the current situation to which it is applied (Epstein, 1973) . Here, proponents of self-consistency theory (Lecky, 1945) would argue that individuals strive to maintain a stable evaluation of their own abilities. However, the more the specific characteristics of a situation correspond to the conditions in which prior experience was made, the more valid self-estimates of intelligence should be. If there is a large difference between the tasks included in the 6 FREUND AND KASTEN psychometric measure and past experience, the specifics of the current situation could prompt test takers to either neglect their self-evaluations based on past experience or at least reassess them. Therefore, the order of assessment of self-estimated and psychometrically assessed intelligence can be expected to have an impact. If the psychometric test is taken first, the subsequent self-estimate should be influenced by this concrete (and vivid) experience, which in the usual study setup will have preceded the selfestimation by a comparably short time (of course, it is assumed that feedback of results will be postponed until after the collection of the self-estimates). Often, both assessments will even be tied together in applied contexts. In contrast, asking participants to give their self-estimates first means that they will need to rely exclusively on past experience that (a) may potentially differ quite a lot from the tasks used in the study, and/or (b) have a significant time lag, or (c) may even not be available to some participants. Accordingly, the assessment of future performance is likely to contain more error. We thus expect self-estimated cognitive ability to be more valid when self-estimates are made after the psychometric assessment. This is because self-consistency theory can in principle be used to account for both possible outcomes, but, as we argue, it is more appropriately tied to the scenario where the self-assessment is given first and there is no immediate task experience preceding the self-estimation process.
Gender of participants. Gender differences in self-estimates of cognitive ability have been and are still extensively discussed. There is ongoing discussion on whether differences in selfestimation between men and women are attributable to gender role expectations, or whether they can be ascribed to biological differences between the sexes (e.g., Greven, Harlaar, Kovas, ChamorroPremuzic, & Plomin, 2009; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1975) . We refer to theories highlighting the effects of socialization and gender stereotypes in particular, leading us to the term of gender differences. Many studies have found significant gender differences in the level of self-assessed intellectual abilities (e.g., Beloff, 1992; Byrd & Stacey, 1993; Hogan, 1978; von Stumm, ChamorroPremuzic, & Furnham, 2009) . Commonly, it is reported that women tend to underestimate, while men tend to overestimate, their own level of ability. Note, however, that this also depends on the task type at hand. Szymanowicz and Furnham (2011) provided meta-analytic evidence that there are moderate disparities between men's and women's self-estimations for general, mathematical, and spatial ability, but not for verbal ability.
Despite these findings, it is not really clear to what extent such gender differences lead to differential validity coefficients for self-estimates of ability. If, for instance, men tend to constantly overestimate their level of ability (which would mirror a greater tendency for men to employ self-enhancement strategies; Swann et al., 1987 ), this will not affect the magnitude of the relationship because it induces only an additive shift in the regression line (i.e., the results of the regression are invariant to linear transformations when standardized scores are used as predictor and criterion). Several studies indicate that men are more capable than women of giving valid self-assessments concerning their cognitive abilities, resulting in higher correlation coefficients (e.g., Furnham & Rawles, 1999) . These findings are attributed to common gender stereotypes and other distortions, which lead to less valid estimations for females (Beloff, 1992) . Thus, differences in math self-concept or mathematical self-evaluation (with mathematics perceived as a masculine domain, e.g., Bennett, 1997; Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2004) are frequently consistent with traditional gender role stereotypes favoring boys (e.g., Byrne & Shavelson, 1986; Jackson, Hodge, & Ingram, 1994; Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2004; Wilgenbusch & Merrell, 1999) . This effect is often associated with gender stereotype threat. There is empirical support for a variety of variables influencing the degree of gender stereotype threat vulnerability (e.g., Brown & Josephs, 1999; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2006; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007; Lesko & Corpus, 2006; Oswald & Harvey, 2000) .
Just like stereotype threat with regard to belonging to a certain cultural group can be modeled and interpreted as a source of measurement bias (cf. Wicherts et al., 2005) , it can be due to different expectations for female and male participants, which would explain the differential validity of self-estimates for the two gender groups. On the other hand, Reilly and Mulhern (1995) argued that the empirical evidence for gender differences in the validity of self-estimates appears to be a statistical artifact of noneliminated outliers; that is, only a small proportion of female respondents are responsible for these differences. Therefore, we do not expect substantial gender differences with regard to the validity of self-estimated intelligence.
Sample composition. Drawing samples from a restricted part of the population leads to range restriction and consequently to lower correlations (Alexander, 1988) . Psychological studies often rely on student samples, which typically feature a large proportion of individuals with high cognitive abilities. Nonacademic samples in turn can be expected to show more variability concerning the key variables of interest. Therefore, correlation coefficients between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability obtained from nonacademic samples are expected to be higher than correlation coefficients obtained from purely academic samples.
Year of publication. The year of publication should have an effect on the correlation between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability because it can be assumed that people have a better understanding of the nature and demands of the respective tasks today than in the past. This enhanced understanding is mainly attributed to modern media-especially the Internet-providing easy access to the relevant information. We therefore expect more recent studies to report higher correlations than older studies.
The selection of moderators in this study does not completely cover the favorable measurement conditions identified in Mabe and West (1982) . In particular, we were unable to find enough studies (or the relevant information was not given) on the role of anonymity versus nonanonymity in the experimental situation, prior experience with self-evaluation per se, and participants' expectations. These and other potentially relevant moderators (especially main effects of and interactions with culture) are therefore not investigated in the present analysis but are considered again in the discussion.
Method Literature Search and Study Selection
We employed multiple search strategies in order to identify all relevant studies. First, we used the following keywords and their For inclusion in the meta-analysis, a study had to meet the following standards: (a) The study had to compare a self-estimate of cognitive ability (intelligence) to a psychometrically assessed ability test measure. (b) This psychometric measure had to be collected by means of a standardized cognitive ability test. By standardized, we refer to tests that are administered in a standardized way, are objectively scored (either manually or electronically by the test administrator or a third person), and offer norms that allow inferences about the relative position of a test taker's score with regard to the norm sample. Such norms can either be included in the test manual or, mainly in studies where specifically developed test batteries are used, be derived from the data collected from the study sample. In order to ensure high levels of objectivity and comparability with regard to the criteria observed, other criterion measures, such as grades or experts'/others' (including teachers, parents, and peers) estimates of cognitive ability, were not considered. (c) A direct measure of self-assessed cognitive ability had to be applied. Studies with indirect measures of selfestimations (conclusions that were drawn from subjects' estimates of constructs that are related to cognitive ability, e.g., interest) were not included.
In total, 42 studies reported effect sizes that met these inclusion criteria. The primary reason for rejecting studies was the absence of a psychometrically sound test for the measurement of cognitive ability to which the self-estimate could be related. More than 70 studies (equal to about 29% of the studies identified in the search process) had to be dismissed for this reason.
Coding Process
We developed a standardized coding scheme based on our selection of moderator variables. The following characteristics were coded at the level of the individual effect size:
Methodology of self-assessment. Four categories were used (1 ϭ absolute scale; 2 ϭ relative scale; 3 ϭ relative scale including mention of a specific reference group; 4 ϭ mixed scale).
Ability type. Five categories were used (1 ϭ general cognitive ability; 2 ϭ numerical ability; 3 ϭ spatial ability; 4 ϭ verbal ability; 5 ϭ any other form of cognitive ability).
Order of assessment. Three categories were used (1 ϭ self-estimation first; 2 ϭ ability test first; 3 ϭ unknown/cannot be derived from information in the study).
Gender of participants. Three categories were used (1 ϭ mixed sample; 2 ϭ female sample; 3 ϭ male sample).
Sample composition. Two categories were used (1 ϭ general sample; 2 ϭ student sample).
The following characteristic was coded at the level of the individual study:
Year of publication. The year of publication was registered as a continuous variable. All studies were mean-centered, with the year 1993 representing the mean.
Half of the studies (randomly selected) were first coded by the second author. They were then coded by another rater who was not familiar with the hypotheses. The average interrater reliability was satisfying at ϭ .87. All discrepancies were discussed until consensus was reached. After this adjustment, the remaining studies were coded by the second author.
Computation of Effect Sizes
Since the included studies investigated the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability, most results were directly reported as correlation coefficients. In some cases, a t value for the significance test of r was reported instead of r. r was calculated from t using the standard computation formula (e.g., Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009) . If ␤ coefficients from regression analysis were reported, the conversion formulae given in Peterson and Brown (2005) were used (this concerned two effect sizes). If estimating an effect size was not possible due to missing data, the respective case was excluded from the following analyses. This approach led to the exclusion of one study. In total, 154 effect size measures were obtained from the remaining 41 studies. Table 1 gives an overview of these studies including the specification of the corresponding effect size measures, the coded characteristics of the moderator variables, the number of items used for self-estimation, and the psychometric ability tests used. Most self-estimates (113, or 73.4%) were based on single-item measures; 17 self-estimates (11%) were based on multi-item measures; and for 24 selfestimates (15.6%), no information on the number of items was given.
In 33 cases (21.4%), a test battery was used. These test batteries were composed of different subtests that are usually selected on the grounds of arguments and requirements specific to the individual studies. Their use is predominantly prevalent in recent studies (especially in studies published by the workgroup of Ackerman and colleagues), but the oldest study in the data set, conducted by Cogan, Conklin, and Hollingworth (1915) , also used a test battery. A number of tests (28, or 18.2%) rest on Thurstone's model of the seven primary mental abilities (these tests are the IST 70 and the IST 2000-R, the Leistungsprüfsystem, and the Wilde Intelligenz Test; all of these tests are in German). Furthermore, 22 (14.3%) effect sizes rest on the Differential Aptitude Test, 13 effect sizes (8.4%) rest on the Otis Quick-Scoring Test, and another 12 effect sizes (7.8%) rest on the Wonderlic Personnel Test. For the other 45 effect sizes (29.2%), a total of 17 different tests were used, among them the Baddeley Reasoning Test (6 effect sizes, 3.9%), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (4 effect sizes, 2.6%), Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (4 effect sizes, 2.6%), or the SAT (3 effect sizes, 1.9%).
It is usually recommended to use the Fisher's z-transformed correlation coefficients in meta-analysis because their distribution is more normal than that of the Pearson correlation coefficients (Borenstein et al., 2009; Silver & Dunlap, 1987) independent of the population parameter, . 5 Figure 1 shows that the 154 correlation coefficients appear to be relatively normally distributed. Using the nontransformed correlation coefficients offers the advantage that the results of subsequent moderator analyses can be directly interpreted in the original metric. We therefore decided to perform all analyses on the correlation coefficients. However, in order to check for the robustness of this decision, we also report the meta-analytically derived result for the overall relationship based on the Fisher's z-transformed coefficients.
Analytical Strategy
We conducted a random-effects meta-analysis where most studies in our data set report more than one effect size. In such cases, the main experimental settings are usually the same or at least very similar. In order to cope with any dependencies among these effect sizes, we used the hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) approach to meta-analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) . Here, the effect sizes are nested within the studies. For the included effect size m ϭ 1, . . . , M s in study s ϭ 1, . . . , S, the Level 1 model is simply a measurement model:
where r ms is the sample estimate, ms is the corresponding population parameter, and e ms is the sampling variance associated with r ms , which is approximately normally distributed, e ms ϳ N͑0, 2 ͒. The variance 2 of the error term is given, which is why this is also called a variance-known model for meta-analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) . Since the 154 relationships are distributed over the 41 studies in our data set, we formulated both a within-and a between-study model (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001; Kalaian & Raudenbush, 1996) . At Level 2, the unknown true effect sizes depend on moderators coded at the relationship level (most of the moderators listed in the Coding Process section) and a random error, t ms , which leads to the following within-study model:
where ␤ 0s is the intercept for study s; X kms is the specific value on the experiment characteristic k ϭ 1, . . . , K; and ␤ ms is the corresponding coefficient. t ms is assumed to be normally distributed, t ms ϳ N͑0, 2 ͒. 2 is the variance of the true effect sizes. At Level 3, the study-specific intercept ␤ 0s is decomposed into moderators at the study level and another error term, u:
where ␥ 0 is the Level 3 intercept; W ls is the specific value on a study characteristic l ϭ 1, . . . , L (here, we use year of publication, centered at its grand mean); and ␥ l is the corresponding coefficient. u s is, again, assumed to be normally distributed, u s ϳ N͑0, 2 ͒, and 2 captures the variability in the true effect sizes between the studies. Technically, the unconditional, or "empty," model is a random-effects model, while the conditional model is a mixed-effects model because it includes fixed effects for the moderator variables in addition to the random components. One advantage of this approach is that the models for the calculation of the average effect size and for the moderator variables are nested and can directly be compared in terms of model fit through likelihood-ratio tests. All analyses were conducted with the software HLM 6.08 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2009 ).
Results
Overall Relationship
The 154 effect sizes ranged from r ϭ -.25 to r ϭ .85, with a mean of .32 and a standard deviation of .19. Over 93% (i.e., 144 of the 154) of the effect sizes were positive, indicating initial support for the first hypothesis, that the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive abilities is positive. The accumulated sample size for these 154 effect sizes was 22,256, which corresponds to an average sample size of about 145 participants per study (the minimum sample size was 13, and the maximum sample size was 1,508).
The result of the unconditional multilevel model, which is used to analyze the average effect size including error terms at the relationship and study level, closely resembled this finding. The intercept in this model was estimated at r ϭ .326, with a standard error of 0.021 (p Ͻ .001). The 95% confidence interval for the mean effect size therefore ranged from 0.284 to 0.368. 
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variables should help explain possible sources of variation among the effect sizes.
We also performed a funnel plot analysis to investigate if there was any kind of publication bias toward over-or underpowered studies in our data set. As Figure 2 shows, the majority of the effect sizes have rather low standard errors (smaller than 0.1), meaning that they were estimated with a reasonable degree of precision. Also, there appears to be a moderately asymmetric relationship between the magnitude of effect sizes and their standard errors, which becomes evident in the asymmetric distribution of effect sizes in the range where the standard errors are larger than 0.2 (cf. Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997) . Although there was one outlier (a correlation of .85 in a study by Bailey & Bailey, 1974 , which corresponds to a Fisher's z coefficient of 1.26), this effect size did not have much leverage, and omitting it from the analysis had no impact on the stability of the results. Thus, there is practically no reason to assume that publication bias is a problem in the present meta-analysis. The funnel plot also gives evidence for heterogeneity among effect sizes.
Moderator Analysis
The model including the moderator variables is a straightforward extension of the basic, unconditional model for the overall effect. Before estimating this model, we checked for potential multicollinearity among the moderators at the experiment level. These moderators were all categorical, so we examined possible confounds among them using PRINCALS, a method of principal component analysis for categorical variables (cf. Bijmolt, van Heerde, & Pieters, 2005) . According to Bijmolt et al. (2005) , PRINCALS can be considered a conservative method for the detection of confounds among categorical moderator variables in meta-analysis. The threshold for confounds is typically set at r ϭ .5 (cf. Bijmolt et al., 2005) . For the moderator set in our analysis, we found a total of three correlations that exceeded an absolute value of .5 (-.626, -.629, -.640). The moderators concerned are participant gender and order of assessment (i.e., their dummycoded categories). We consequently performed stability checks of our moderator analyses by omitting the variables related to these high correlations, one at a time. All these models yielded results very similar to those from the full model including all moderator variables. Hence, it can be concluded that multicollinearity was not a problem in our analysis, and we used all moderator variables in order to prevent any potential omitted variable bias. Table 2 summarizes the results of the moderator analysis. The estimate for the intercept in this model is the configuration of all reference categories, that is, the average effect for a relationship observed with the use of absolute scales, assessing general cognitive ability, obtaining self-estimates first, having a mixed sample of nonstudent participants, and conduct of the study in the year 1993.
6 Below, we show how changing this configuration influences the size of the relationship.
Before 2 (2) ϭ 0.058, p Ͼ .500. While these tests indicate that except for the moderator variable ability type, the differences between the categories of the moderators were not statistically significant, they are nondirectional, and they may mask potential single-category effects. Also, since we formulated directed hypotheses with regard to the effects of the different categories, we proceeded to test all single categories for their significance.
Methodology of self-assessment. Consistent with our hypothesis, and contrary to the suggestions of the omnibus test, there were significant differences between the four common methods of self-assessment. Estimates obtained from relative scales showed an improvement over estimates obtained from absolute scales (a regression coefficient, b, of 0.089, p Ͻ .05). Using an explicit reference group to which comparisons are to be made led to an even larger increase (b ϭ 0.136, p Ͻ .05). In contrast, using a mixed scale, that is, a hybrid of a relative and an absolute scale, did not show a significant improvement over absolute scales (b ϭ 0.017, p ϭ .706).
Ability type. In line with our hypotheses, we found a large effect for the use of numerical abilities (vs. general cognitive ability), at b ϭ 0.161 (p Ͻ .01). However, the effects for spatial and verbal abilities were both nonsignificant and thus suggest that assessing these abilities does not lead to more valid self-estimates (b ϭ -0.002 and b ϭ 0.039, respectively). As expected, assessing nonstandard cognitive abilities significantly decreased the size of the relationship (b ϭ -0.101, p Ͻ .01).
Order of assessment. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significantly higher validity for self-estimates when the standardized test was applied first (b ϭ 0.045, p ϭ .090). For a relatively large number of effect sizes (35, or 22.7%), however, it could not be determined whether the self-assessment or the standardized test was administered first, and the effect for this category ("mixed/unknown") was not significant (b ϭ 0.033, p ϭ .221).
Gender of participants. These results were consistent with our hypothesis. Relying exclusively on either female or male samples did not significantly influence the validity of selfestimates of intelligence, compared to the standard case of using mixed samples (b ϭ -0.014 and b ϭ -0.010, respectively, both ps Ͼ .500).
Sample composition. The majority of the relationships (86 out of 154, or approximately 56%) were obtained from student samples, which we expected to lead to a lower validity due to range restrictions. In the present meta-analysis, we did not find a significant effect (b ϭ -0.031, p ϭ .220).
Year of publication. We found a significant effect for year of publication (mean-centered at 1993), at b ϭ -0.002, p ϭ .033. Note, however, that there was one study (Cogan et al., 1915) that represented an extreme outlier with regard to its year of publication. A subsequent analysis where this study and its two effect sizes were removed from the data set led to a change in the significance of the moderator (b ϭ -0.0008, p ϭ .252); the estimate for this parameter then became insignificant because the two effect sizes reported in Cogan et al. (1915) were both large and positive (rs ϭ .70 and .53, respectively).
For the effect sizes included in our data set, the largest empirical Bayes estimate, at r ϭ .78, was for a relationship obtained from a female sample of nonstudents, relative scales including explicit mention of a reference group, general mental ability, and administering the ability test first (the study was conducted in 1974). This correlation would lead to an SEE of 9.39 IQ points. In contrast, the SEE based on the overall estimate of r ϭ .33 for the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability would be 14.16 IQ points, a difference of 4.77 IQ points.
In the moderator model, the variance component at the effect size level, 2 , which is now the residual variance that is conditional on the moderator variables, was estimated at 0.008, 2 (101) ϭ 328.144, p Ͻ .001, and the conditional variance component at the study level, 2 , where year of publication is included as a moderator, was estimated at 0.006, 2 (39) ϭ 114.120, p Ͻ .001. These coefficients show that significant variation in the true effect sizes can be explained by the Level 2 moderators, as is shown by a significant chi-square statistic for the comparison of the variance components between the unconditional and the conditional models, ⌬ 2 (12) ϭ 189.237, p Ͻ .001, and while at Level 3, year of publication significantly explained between-studies variation in the effect sizes, ⌬ 2 (1) ϭ 4.723, p Ͻ .05, this was no longer the case if we eliminated the two effect sizes from the Cogan et al. § Parameter becomes nonsignificant upon removal of two effect sizes (outliers with respect to year of publication; study by Cogan et al., 1915) .
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(1915) study. Finally, we checked whether the conditional model did in fact exhibit superior fit over the unconditional model by conducting a likelihood-ratio test to assess the change in the deviance statistics between the models. For the unconditional model, D ϭ 663.974, df ϭ 3, and for the conditional model, D ϭ 600.920, df ϭ 16. The difference in the deviance statistics was 63.054, df ϭ 13, which is also highly significant at p Ͻ .001, lending further proof that the inclusion of the moderators increases model fit.
Discussion
Interpretation of Results and Theoretical Implications
The two main goals of our meta-analysis were to (a) provide a synthesized mean effect size for the relationship between selfestimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability and (b) explain the variation between effect sizes as a function of moderator variables. These goals address two substantial questions: whether people are capable of estimating their own cognitive ability and which factors influence the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability.
With regard to the first question, we found an average effect size of r ϭ .33. Following Cohen (1988) , this can be regarded as a medium-sized effect. It is also very similar to the mean effect size of r ϭ .34 reported by Mabe and West (1982) almost 30 years ago, which was based on a small number of 12 studies only. Using this correlation to actually predict tested cognitive ability with selfestimates led to an SEE of 14.16 IQ points (assuming a standard deviation of 15, as in the standard-normal IQ distribution). This precision can be compared to the SEM of a standardized ability test with, for instance, a reported reliability coefficient of .90. The corresponding SEM is 4.74 IQ points, about one third of the self-estimate SEE of 14.16 IQ points. Thus, using self-estimates as proxies for standardized ability tests appears to be a rather imprecise endeavor, suggesting that the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability is not very high. Note, however, that empirically obtained validity coefficients seldom surpass levels of r ϭ .50 -in fact, the well-acclaimed validity coefficient of general cognitive ability for the prediction of professional job achievement has been meta-analytically documented to be at r ϭ .51 (corrected for range restriction and unreliability; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) .
With regard to the second question, however, the variance components at Levels 2 and 3 showed that there was significant heterogeneity among the effect sizes. This heterogeneity can be explained reasonably well through the moderator variables. Relative scales seem to prompt people to make interpersonal comparisons, which increase validity. They are even more valid if a specific reference group is named. Absolute scales, on the other hand, do not explicitly call for such comparisons. Based on our findings, the use of mixed scales cannot be recommended either, as they also seem not to directly facilitate comparisons to others. While the superiority of relative scales over absolute and mixed scales is hardly surprising, the degree of superiority was quite large. Apparently, although the accuracy of self-estimates primarily based on intraindividual comparisons (as initiated by the use of absolute scales) is not very high, utilizing social anchors to determine their own level of cognitive ability is of great help to individuals (see also Goffin & Olson, 2011) . Considering social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) , these results show that explicitly making people self-assess their own cognitive ability in comparison to others significantly improves the magnitude of the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability. Asking for self-estimates, therefore, should always be done with relative scales and the mention of a specific reference group. However, it is conceivable that eliciting social comparisons may interact with phenomena such as stereotype threat. The activation of a negative stereotype for members of a minority group may not only impede their actual test performance (as has been shown extensively in the extant literature) but also insert a bias into the self-estimation process. Empirically, Aronson and Inzlicht (2004) provided evidence that stereotype threat vulnerability leads to inaccurate and unstable self-assessment of cognitive abilities. The authors suggested that the tendency to be affected by stereotype threat creates barriers to developing a stable and unbiased self-concept.
We expected numerical, spatial, and verbal abilities to show comparable levels of validity. Compared to the reference category (general cognitive ability), however, only self-estimates of numerical ability led to such an effect, while the validity of self-estimates of spatial and verbal abilities did not differ from that of selfestimates of general cognitive ability. Numerical ability seems to be especially salient and easy to self-estimate, whereas spatial and verbal abilities are not (cf. Ackerman & Wolman, 2007) . One explanation for this could be based on how students make subjectspecific experiences at school: Most people find out quite soon whether they are generally good or not at numbers and math, because the correct solutions, including the calculation method, are usually nonambiguous and give direct feedback of success. Because numerical ability tasks are similar to numerical tasks known from educational contexts, most people should have a good understanding of their numerical abilities. Verbal tasks, such as analogies, or odd-word-out tasks, are generally more open to interpretation, making it harder to clearly differentiate between correct and false answers. Also, these tasks differ hugely from spelling, grammar, and literature interpretation tasks typically encountered at school. While spatial abilities play a role at school (especially in science, e.g., three-dimensional representations of molecules etc.), concrete tasks concerning these abilities are quite often met in psychological tests for the first time, so that little to no experience is available (judging lengths and distances, a regular everyday task, is generally of only minor importance in tests of spatial ability). Previous results show a somewhat closer association of mathematical than of verbal self-concept or self-estimates with corresponding school achievement and thus support this assumption tentatively (Byrne & Gavin, 1996) . However, these effects are rather inconsistent and need further empirical testing. Asking for self-estimates of less frequently assessed cognitive abilities nevertheless significantly decreases validity. These findings underline the importance of good familiarity, little ambiguity, and accumulated experience with the task type. Still, stereotype threat may again be a possible interacting factor here, with respect to the ability chosen for the self-assessment.
Regarding the order of assessment, we could not confirm our hypothesis that taking the standardized test first would lead to increased validity coefficients. This is a surprise insofar as the immediately preceding experience of working on tasks that represent the ability should facilitate the accuracy of self-estimates. The 16 FREUND AND KASTEN nonsignificance of this effect could be explained by selfconsistency theory (Lecky, 1945) . People have built an image of their abilities over a long time and will strive to prevent this image from being altered by a single, albeit recent, experience. Therefore, the validity of the ratings is not influenced significantly. In addition, feedback on the results from the standardized test is usually not given until after the self-estimates have been made, so people actually do not know how they or others fared on the test.
Most relationships were calculated for mixed samples. Relationships obtained from samples consisting exclusively of females or males, however, were neither significantly better nor worse. Apparently, there is no gender difference with respect to the validity of self-estimates. This finding does not support the assumption that female test takers experience feelings of stereotype threat that induce a kind of nonuniform measurement bias with regard to regression slopes for the relationship into the test scores (cf. Wicherts et al., 2005) . There is a well-documented effect of gender differences with regard to the level of self-estimates of cognitive abilities (e.g., Furnham, Hosoe, & Tang, 2002; Rammstedt & Rammsayer, 2000; Szymanowicz & Furnham, 2011) . However, this gender effect does not necessarily lead to decreased validity coefficients if it becomes equally effective for all subjects, because correlation coefficients are invariant to linear transformations when both the scores on the predictor and criterion are standardized. This corresponds to a measurement bias that affects only the between-groups intercepts. Furthermore, from a conceptual perspective, any kind of measurement bias with regard to participant gender would need to be explained in terms of how it is generated, developed, and (possibly) modified or sustained. Gender stereotypes are societal mechanisms that appear also to be influenced by culture (e.g., Guimond et al., 2007) . While the results for the moderator variable gender of participants presented here seem to argue that there is no differential validity for females and males, they cannot go beyond this finding and explain the underlying mechanisms. In addition, it has to be noted that the majority of effect sizes were calculated on the basis of mixed samples consisting of both male and female subjects. More precisely, only 25 (or 16%) and 26 (17%) effect sizes were based on exclusively male or female samples, respectively. Thus, the absence of gender differences regarding the validity of self-estimates may also be due to lack of statistical power.
The nonsignificant effect for academic samples allows us to reject our assumption that range restriction leads to lower validity coefficients. There are at least two plausible explanations for this finding. First, academic samples in the field often consist of psychology students who gain a better understanding of cognitive ability than laypeople because of the subject they study. They also have more opportunities to collect experience with psychological tests and therefore know what to expect and how to react in such achievement situations. Second, a motivational bias that favors self-enhancement in job selection contexts is likely to be absent when the stakes are low. Such a detrimental bias can therefore arguably be avoided when researchers are relying on student samples.
With regard to the year of publication, we found no support for our hypothesis that more recent studies would lead to larger relationships after removal of the two effect sizes reported by Cogan et al. (1915) , despite the widespread use and accessibility of ability tests through modern media, especially the Internet. This could mean three things. One, the year of publication of a study is not well-suited to function as a proxy for (real) experiences with ability tests; two, the availability of do-it-yourself tests does not correspond to making such experiences; or three, such experiences do not contribute to a more precise self-estimate. The results of the present analysis cannot provide a definite answer to this question, but we extend the discussion of this factor below.
Concluding from the results of the moderator analysis, the validity of self-estimates can be improved dependent on the configuration of the moderators, which in turn has an effect on the SEE. At r ϭ .78, the highest empirical Bayes estimate implies an SEE of 9.39 IQ points. However, realizing the configuration associated with this estimate, which features a sample of female nonstudents, relative scales with explicit mention of a specific reference group, the assessment of general cognitive ability, and the administration of the ability test before the self-estimate is made, may not always be possible in practice. With respect to the factor methodology of self-assessment, it depends on what kind of reference group is available in a given situation. Quite often, there is no clearly defined reference group, or the reference group is very heterogeneous. It may in fact even be of interest to make people self-estimate their ability with reference to a heterogeneous reference group. Thus, implementation of this favorable measurement condition may be somewhat fuzzy. The choice of the ability type is also supposed to be dictated by the demands of the specific situation where the self-assessment is required. For example, it may simply be irrelevant to have an applicant for an interpreter job self-estimate her or his numerical ability, while the self-assessment of verbal ability would be of interest instead. From a substantive point of view, of the theories outlined in the background section, Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison and Lecky's (1945) self-consistency theory receive support from the results of the present meta-analysis. However, it has to be noted that the theory of self-enhancement (Swann et al., 1987) cannot really be assessed with the data presented in the present meta-analysis, as the focus is solely on the validity of self-estimates, expressed through their correlations with psychometric test scores, and not on the degree of over-or underestimation of ability, information that would be needed in order to put self-enhancement theory to the test. In the next subsection, we discuss practical implications of the findings of the present meta-analysis.
Practical Implications
For practitioners, the rather low overall effect of r ϭ .33 and the large influences of some of the moderator variables have a variety of implications. First, when counselees are asked to self-estimate their own ability, they should not be expected to be capable of giving a correct self-assessment, regardless of the concrete conditions under which the self-assessment is taking place. Instead, the differences between the self-estimate and the result from the standardized ability test can give meaningful diagnostic information about how realistically a person views her-or himself. This is underlined by the proportion of shared variance in the two constructs, which corresponds to just 10.89% for the overall relationship (r ϭ .33), although it can be as high as 60.84% for the "optimal" measurement conditions identified by the moderator analysis (r ϭ .78). This information is potentially relevant in career counseling (including counseling in school psychology) and 17 VALIDITY OF SELF-ESTIMATES OF COGNITIVE ABILITY personnel selection contexts in its own right. While the validity of psychometric ability tests (more precisely, general cognitive ability) for the prediction of academic and professional attainment has been shown to be superior to that of most other variables (at a corrected r ϭ .51; cf. Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) , there is little to no information on the (incremental) validity of self-estimated ability for the same objective criteria. It is conceivable that self-estimates of cognitive ability, representing core beliefs about one's own self-concept, influence the degree of effort people put forward when confronted with achievement tasks in educational and professional settings. This is a potentially useful piece of information that can be obtained easily. Of course, using self-estimates instead of psychometric ability tests for selecting job applicants is unrealistic because of self-enhancement bias (cf. Swann et al., 1987) that cannot be controlled (and neither could its degree be tested in the present meta-analysis). But their use appears to be promising in the job search domain (Prediger, 1999) and, with respect to job selection, could provide incremental validity when compared with the actual ability test scores. When self-estimates are used for this purpose, a careful and thorough instruction should also be included so that the reason for obtaining them becomes clear and individuals understand that they should attempt to be as accurate as possible in their self-assessment. Additional studies are needed here, as they would help advance the empirical state of research. Furthermore, Furnham (2005a) argued that self-estimates are relevant to job-related training and may even actually predict work performance beyond scores on psychometric ability tests in specific occupational contexts. On another note, self-estimates should also facilitate understanding of individual differences in career choice, decision making, and job performance (cf. Prediger, 1999; Wolman, 2009) . However, all of these empirical considerations require at least reliable measurement of self-assessed cognitive ability. As can be seen in Table 1 , the overwhelming majority of included effect size measures (a total of 113 correlation coefficients, or 73%) referred to self-estimates based on only one item. To ensure reliability and to increase validity more considerations are necessary regarding the measurement of self-estimated cognitive abilities. With respect to future studies, priority should be given to the development of appropriate psychometric measures of self-assessment.
Second, from a practitioner's point of view, the norms available for an ability test are crucial as well. Some test manuals offer a wide selection of norms for very different, and clearly defined, groups, while others provide rather global norms. Therefore, for some ability tests, using a specific reference group in order to obtain respective self-estimates is not feasible. In applied settings, it may also be an option to develop norms based on the data collected from prior and the present test administrations. The samples used for such norming processes can often be characterized as being rather specific. For instance, applicants for a university program in medicine may have to take a specific ability test, and if there is a large number of applicants per year, the development of norms for this kind of group becomes possible. Note, however, that in selection and placement settings, test security and test fairness are vital topics, so that test forms have to be equated because they are continually modified (e.g., Kolen & Brennan, 2004) .
Third, the psychometric properties of test scores have to be taken into account by practitioners as well as by test takers. This begins with the degree of unreliability inherent in the scores, so that confidence intervals around test scores based on the test's SEM have to be computed. It further concerns the appropriateness of measurement models for the application to test data and also potential bias with regard to certain groups (as indicated by the absence of measurement invariance, respectively the presence of differential item functioning, cf. Reise et al., 1993; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) . Laypeople in general lack the knowledge to interpret ability test scores correctly and therefore need professional advice, lest they seriously misinterpret their results. Provision of this information is best practice.
Finally, accurate estimates of competencies and deficits are useful in educational settings highlighting self-assessments as a vital part of self-regulation (Eva & Regehr, 2007) . Besides traditional models of teacher-directed learning, the concept of selfdirected learning, which is associated with lifelong learning (Candy, 1991) , has become a central issue in the study and practice of education (e.g., Boud, 1995; Garrison, 1997) . Since the ability to direct and to regulate one's own learning is crucial to success in many professions and in other fields where knowledge is continuously evolving (Shokar, Shokar, Romero, & Bulik, 2002) , curricula are designed to foster accurate self-assessment of competencies as a lifelong habit (Miflin, Campbell, & Price, 2000) .
Critical Aspects of the Present Meta-Analysis
The results of our meta-analysis have to be interpreted cautiously with regard to the following factors.
Problems due to deficits in the empirical data basis. The empirical data basis does not allow for the investigation of other potentially relevant moderator variables. Mabe and West (1982) proposed nine measurement conditions influencing the validity of self-estimates. Using the studies included in our data set, we could not identify enough variation (if mentioned at all) with respect to the explicit assurance of anonymity, instructions emphasizing the comparison of self-assessments to objective tests, or prior selfevaluation experience, mainly because the number of studies reporting these experimental characteristics was insufficient. The same applies to moderator variables such as the influence of potential reward on the validity of self-assessment. This moderator variable is of particular interest because it seems reasonable that self-estimates made in selection settings should lead to less valid results simply because people are motivated to deliver as favorable an impression as possible. Virtually all effect sizes in the data set were obtained from low-stakes situations, where people are less likely to engage in impression management and individual outcomes are typically of only little importance. In low-stakes situations, individuals will further differ considerably with regard to test-taking (also labeled current achievement) motivation. Testtaking motivation has also been shown to be related to test performance (e.g., Freund, Kuhn, & Holling, 2011) . When test takers are informed that their self-assessments are to be compared to their actual ability test scores, such a bias should be avoided (see also the subsection on practical implications above). Future studies should therefore explicitly investigate how the testing context influences the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability.
Prior experience with cognitive ability tests, and with selfevaluation as well, can be strongly expected to facilitate the 18 FREUND AND KASTEN precision of self-estimates because naturally, experience entails performance feedback. Effects of feedback potentially have large implications (e.g., Berdie, 1954; Froehlich & Moser, 1954) . Therefore, using the information on how one has performed on a test, or how precise one's self-estimation has been in the past, should influence the validity of self-estimates, as would also be predicted by self-consistency theory (Lecky, 1945) . This point was also discussed by Mabe and West in 1982 , but it appears that ensuing studies did not incorporate it to a sufficient degree. However, prior experience with ability tests entails another problem. There is ample meta-analytic evidence that retesting leads to higher test scores, and such score gains can even be increased with training (for a recent meta-analysis see Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Moriarty Gerrard, 2007) . Furthermore, the magnitude of these retest and training effects is affected by a number of moderators, among them the task type(s) used in the test. But while scores may be rising across test administrations, the actual ability level is assumed to be relatively stable. From a psychometric point of view, several researchers have shown that retesting induces measurement bias that makes it difficult to compare initial test and retest scores (e.g., Lievens, Reeve, & Heggestad, 2007) . Individual test takers are therefore expected to make assessments that are affected by a number of psychometric problems, the concepts of which are difficult to understand for nonexperts.
These aspects also affect the implicit theories of test takers mentioned in the background section. A personality construct relevant to implicit theories is the incrementalist/entitist personality type as introduced by Dweck (e.g., Dweck, 2006; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) . According to Dweck, individuals' implicit theories about abilities differ with regard to how malleable they think such abilities are. An individual who believes that abilities can be improved is called an incrementalist with a "growth" mindset, while an individual who believes that abilities are stable and cannot really be improved is an entitist with a "fixed" mindset. Meta-analytic results on how retesting and training help to increase scores on cognitive ability tests (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2007; Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, & Kulik, 1984; lend support to the appropriateness of a growth mindset, which in turn can be assumed to lead individuals to reflect on their performance more deeply and critically assess their errors in order to improve. This may subsequently affect the processes involved when people are asked to self-estimate their own cognitive ability.
Valid self-evaluation is also critical for self-organized learning across the life span. Experience and training can help enhancing agreement of self-evaluation with objective criteria (Sluijsmans, Dochy, & Moerkerke, 1999) . Again, Dweck's incrementalist/ entitist personality type could have an impact here. People who are incrementalists should be expected to more strongly engage in metacognitive thinking about their own performance on cognitive tasks and strive to get better. In order to do so, they invariably develop a better understanding of where different performance levels rank and accordingly become better at comparing their own ability to that of others. In contrast, entitists tend to believe that their ability levels are fixed and cannot really be improved, so they may engage less in thinking about what different ability levels really mean and, especially, how relative they actually are. In the studies included in the present meta-analysis, information about whether individual participants had prior experience either with ability tests or with self-estimation of ability could not be obtained, and neither could it be determined if the participants in a particular study were incrementalists or entitists, but it appears promising to conduct studies investigating these factors.
Based on the findings of Kruger and Dunning (1999) , who reported that mainly individuals in the lower area of the ability distribution tend to heavily misjudge their ability level, it would be interesting to investigate if actual ability level has an influence on the magnitude of the relationship between self-estimates and psychometric test scores. However, the primary studies included in the present meta-analysis generally do not provide the necessary information to do so. One would at least need separate effect sizes for distinct ability groups. This aspect is therefore better suited for investigation in a primary study.
The vast majority of the studies were conducted in Western countries, using student samples. There is ongoing discussion on the generalizability of such results. Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) dubbed the common study sample as WEIRD (participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies). Cultural differences can be expected to play a huge role, in particular regarding conceptions of intelligence (Chen & Chen, 1988; Heath, 1983; Nisbett, 2003; Sternberg & Kaufman, 1998) , test performance (through stereotype threat; e.g., Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995) , and the importance of selfimpression management (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999) . In many Eastern (i.e., primarily Asian) countries, for instance, social interaction abilities are considered to be more important than individual cognitive abilities (e.g., Nevo & Khader, 1995) . Accordingly, these factors could affect the magnitude of the relationship between self-estimates and tested cognitive ability. Because the results obtained from psychometric tests are used as criteria for advancement in educational and professional careers, such cultural differences in how the psychological constructs being measured are viewed and interpreted can also be expected to exert a direct influence on life outcomes. If, for instance, a member of a minority group applies for a job and is asked to take a test that has been found to function well with members of the majority group, it needs to be ascertained that the test's applicability can be generalized across groups. It is considered best practice to make sure that no individual, regardless of her or his cultural or societal background, has any kind of disadvantage due to biased tests (Byrne et al., 2009) . Psychometric measures of any kind used in such contexts (including intelligence tests) should therefore routinely be checked, validated, and, if necessary, modified. This should ultimately lead to improved quality-and acceptance across groups-of tests. Additionally, gender differences in selfestimates of IQ do in part depend on cultural factors (Furnham, 2001) , casting doubts on the cross-cultural generalizability of our meta-analytical results. Gender issues, of course, can be assessed and modeled in the same methodological framework as any other kind of between-groups issue.
As a starting point for investigating cultural impact on the meaning of psychological constructs such as cognitive ability (in performance and self-estimation), comparisons between traditional "Western" and "Eastern" samples appear interesting and practically feasible, but they should not stop there. In the data set of the present meta-analysis, there are not enough studies investigating the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability in Eastern samples, so a comparison be- Cross-cultural designs are generally desirable in modern empirical studies investigating relationships between psychological constructs (e.g., Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998) because they help overcome problems associated with WEIRD samples. They also appear to be particularly promising for a topic like that of the present meta-analysis, as they can address similarities and differences between cultures with regard to measures of self-assessment and psychometric measures by analyzing questions of measurement invariance (e.g., van de Vijver & Leung, 1997 and how these two kinds of measures are interrelated. As discussed above, it is possible, for instance, that biasing phenomena such as stereotype threat could be triggered for members of different cultural groups when tests ask for social comparisons in the self-estimation process. These arguments help to show that investigations into the psychometric properties of test scores are not a purely technical endeavor but instead contribute to the sound methodological conduct of empirical studies. They can readily be carried out if researchers use adequate study designs. In order to arrive at a genuine and deep understanding of how psychological processes function in individuals, there is a definitive need to carry out studies under a much wider variety of conditions, in order to overcome the many problems associated with WEIRD research. The subject of the present meta-analysis integrates psychological constructs from the cognitive domain that play a huge role in everyday life, and it is therefore desirable that the best available research methods should be applied to advance the field. This is clearly a goal future studies should strive to attain.
Furthermore, although in the present meta-analysis we have examined a number of moderators at the experiment level (i.e., situational and methodological moderators), we were unable to investigate moderators influencing the genesis and stability of self-estimates. There are at least three factors that are of potential interest here. The first factor is personality (especially the Big Five), which is assumed to have a substantial impact on selfestimates . Also, constructs with a close proximity to task interest and performance, such as need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or typical intellectual engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) , appear promising. The second factor is perceived task difficulty. Fischhoff (1977, 1980) were able to show that easy tasks lead to underestimates of ability, while hard tasks lead to overestimates. Finally, self-worth may play a significant role in the development of self-estimates, as self-enhancement bias can help to protect against detrimental, negative self-estimates in light of poor performance (Trope, 1986) .
Corrections for Unreliability and Other Artifacts
Correcting for study artifacts is common practice in metaanalyses aiming at validity generalization in order to assess the magnitude of the relationship at the construct level. In particular, the imperfect reliability of both the predictor and the criterion impose a lower bound on the observed relationship . Reliability, of course, is always a property of test scores and never of instruments (e.g., Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) . Therefore, it is necessary that information on the reliability of test scores in primary studies is communicated. While providing information on test score reliability has become standard practice for most scientific journals, this information is often given rather globally. For instance, if some kind of test is applied, but the results are reported at the level of subgroups, information on test score reliability is often restricted to the level of the entire sample, and it would be incorrect to assume the same level of reliability for the subgroup scores. In the data set used for the present metaanalysis, we found usable information on the reliability of the test scores for only 14 of the 154 effect sizes. This is a percentage of just about 9%.
Usable information on the reliability of self-estimates was provided more often, for 54, or about 35%, of the 154 effect sizes (as a trend, studies reporting the appropriate information on reliabilities of self-estimates and test scores were among the more recent studies). Here, the unweighted average reliability coefficient (representing different kinds of reliability coefficients, but primarily estimates for Cronbach's alpha) was .77, with a standard deviation of .14. The range of these coefficients was between .32 and .97. This indicates a wide range of reliability coefficients, and in some studies, the self-estimate scores clearly suffered from a high degree of unreliability, which may be due to choice of method, number of items (approximately 73% of the self-estimates were based on only one item), or other potential sources. However, both figures are far from adequate to correct for the unreliability in either the criterion (standardized test scores) or the predictor (self-estimates of ability). It is therefore recommended that future studies report the necessary information at the respective levels and not just provide information on global test score reliability.
Number of Items Used for Obtaining Self-Estimates
As indicated above, most effect sizes in the present metaanalysis were based on self-estimates obtained with one-item measures. In contrast, the ability measures were (usually) aggregate scores based on a much larger number of items. Besides expectable differences in the reliability of these scores, this corresponds to an asymmetrical relationship because an aggregate score covers a variety of different sources and is therefore much more diverse than a one-item measure, which explicitly demands cognitive integration of a number of concrete experiences (in this case, attempts to solve a number of items on an ability test). Hence, balancing out the level of aggregation could increase the validity of self-estimates. To our knowledge, empirical studies investigating such effects are lacking, so this is another topic future studies should look into.
Conclusions
With regard to the meta-analysis by Mabe and West (1982) , which was conducted almost 30 years ago, it is interesting that the overall relationship remains virtually unchanged (metaanalytically derived effect sizes of r ϭ .34 vs. r ϭ .33). On the one hand, this indicates temporal stability of the relationship. It seems that while people are somewhat capable of giving valid selfestimates, especially under favorable conditions, the degree of accuracy is genuinely limited. On the other hand, a critical assessment of the studies carried out post-Mabe and West shows that the majority of them did not incorporate all of the-and often not even the most influential-favorable measurement conditions suggested in order to maximize the relationship between self-assessed and psychometrically measured (cognitive) ability. In fact, the majority of effect size measures published after 1982 adhere to only three favorable measurement conditions or fewer (79 of 120, or 66%). This can be interpreted in at least two ways. One, the suggested measurement conditions are not easy to establish. This excuse may be deemed valid only for Mabe and West's measurement condition (h), which states that subjects should have experience in the self-evaluation of abilities. Clearly, this condition is unrealistic to uphold in a typical empirical study. All the other favorable measurement conditions appear readily implementable, conditional on whether researchers strive to pursue finding the maximum relationship between the two constructs. Two, studies conducted since the publication of Mabe and West's 1982 article deliberately vary with regard to adhering to these favorable measurement conditions in order to test their impact empirically. This would result in stringent tests of Mabe and West's advice and consequently an advance in the field. Upon closer inspection, it seems that a sizable number of studies were not specifically designed to put the favorable measurement conditions suggested by Mabe and West to the test. This may be at least in part be due to the primary focus of these studies, which was not always the relationship of interest to the present meta-analysis.
As Henrich et al. (2010) pointed out, the generalizability of results from studies investigating psychological phenomena is limited when these studies do not cross cultural boundaries. We agree with their recommendations to conduct research beyond a WEIRD context. In this regard, the use of suitable statistical methods is also recommended, for instance, in the analysis of potentially debilitating testing effects, such as stereotype threat (cf. Wicherts et al., 2005) . These methods help to answer questions such as if observed differences between groups (cultural, gender, age, etc.) are true differences or due to measurement bias. For the present meta-analysis, we have to confine our interpretations to the current (up to 2011) empirical database and cannot address the kind of measurement issues discussed in this article.
To conclude, based upon the results of the present metaanalysis, particularly valid self-estimates can be expected if individuals are requested to provide relative appraisals of their numerical ability compared to a clearly specified comparison group.
Our meta-analysis offers new insight into the relationship between self-estimated and psychometrically assessed cognitive ability. It illustrates the variability among effect sizes and shows under which conditions more valid self-estimates can be obtained. It appears that self-estimates provide interesting diagnostic information in their own right, but it remains to be shown how useful this information can really be in applied contexts. However, many potential moderators could not be investigated because they have not been implemented in empirical studies. Future studies should therefore explicitly integrate such promising moderators in order to provide further information on how the validity of self-estimates of cognitive ability can be enhanced. We have argued in different places that the relationship between self-assessed and psychometrically measured cognitive ability may be affected by biasing phenomena, especially stereotype threat, which can manifest itself in various ways. In multigroup as well as longitudinal study designs, there is a definitive need for researchers to investigate issues of measurement invariance. In such cases, if measurement invariance is not tenable, the interpretation of score differences across groups and/or time becomes difficult. Researchers should therefore also take advantage of modern psychometric and statistical methods, such as latent variable, multigroup, and multilevel modeling.
